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ABSTRACT
In this paper we introduce a new software concept specifically designed to allow the digital forensics
professional to clearly identify and attribute instances of LSB image steganography by using the
original cover image in side-by-side comparison with a suspected steganographic payload image.
The "CounterSteg"software allows detailed analysis and comparison of both the original cover image
and any modified image, using sophisticated bit- and color-channel visual depiction graphics. In
certain cases, the steganographic software used for message transmission can be identified by the
forensic analysis of LSB and other changes in the payload image. The paper demonstrates usage
and typical forensic analysis with eight commonly available steganographic programs. Future work
will attempt to automate the typical types of analysis and detection. This is important, as currently
there is a steep rise in the use of image LSB steganographic techniques to hide the payload code
used by malware and viruses, and for the purposes of data exfiltration. This results because of the
fact that the hidden code and/ or data can more easily bypass virus and malware signature detection
in such a manner as being surreptitiously hidden in an otherwise innocuous image file.
Keywords: Steganography, steganalysis, digital forensics, malware, virus, LSB encoding.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Steganography use in malware and for covert
communications is on the rise according to
many computer security research organizations.
Payload images can also bypass data
exfiltration mechanisms with relative ease, as
positive identification of message-carrying
images is elusive.
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2.

STEGANOGRAPHY
SCENARIOS

Steganography has been successfully used for
data
exfiltration,
espionage,
concealed
communications, command and control for
botnets
orchestration,
malvertising, and
ransomware propagation, among other covert
and malicious applications. Below is a list of
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examples of how steganography can typically
operate in various application case scenarios
(Gutub, Ankeer, Abu-Ghalioun, Shaheen, Alvi
2008):

•

•

•

•

An employee decides to steal sensitive
proprietary files. With today's security
systems, this would be noticed using
classic approaches; however, using
steganography, the sensitive files are
encoded into images. By doing so, the
images can be uploaded to social
networks or cloud storage services
without triggering red flags.
A group of cybercriminals is attempting
to communicate and synchronize attacks
from different countries. Since they
cannot
go
through
standard
communication channels, they decide to
conceal secret messages into profile
pictures of social accounts . In this way,
they can communicate by uploading and
downloading unsuspicious profile photos
using whitelisted services.
A massive botnet has been deployed and
is awaiting instructions. Any attempt of
communication from a central server to
the bots is likely to be discovered
eventually. Instead of using a server, the
bots are configured to periodically
download a feed of text and images from
a public social network account. By
decoding steganographic data from the
feed, instructions are extracted and
executed.
A malicious campaign is planned to
affect millions of users, but the
perpetrators want to keep it as secret as
possible. Since the goal is to exploit a
browser
vulnerability,
they
use
steganography to conceal malicious code
into advertisement images. To reach a
large audience quickly, they submit the
banner to networks that distribute the
image over hundreds of websites. By
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•

doing so the propagation is guaranteed
and the campaign revenue can be larger.
A new ransomware attack hides the
communication between the victims and
the perpetrator. Using steganography
information harvested from the target
system is encoded into pictures uploaded
to an image hosting website. Using this
tactic, the ransomware campaign
deployment can remain hidden for a
longer period of time.

Tragically, all the examples stated above are
based on actual malware case histories.
Although many of these attacks were eventually
identified and stopped, the amount of time and
effort required to detect and stop steganography
related attacks and communications was large
and continues to be take enormous investigative
resources and knowledge. The result is that
steganography continues to be a very lucrative
technique and opportunity for cybercriminals.

2 .1 Rise in the Usage of
Steg;anography for lv1alware
Recently we have seen steganography used m
the
following
malware
programs
and
cyberespionage tools:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Microcin, alias Six Little Monkeys;
NetTraveler;
Zberp;
Enfal, which possesses a new loader
called Zero. T;
Shamoon;
KinS;
ZeusVM;
Triton, alias Fibbit.

Why are malware authors increasingly using
steganography in their creations? There are
three main reasons for this: 1. It helps them
conceal not just the data itself but the fact that
data is being uploaded and downloaded; 2. It
helps bypass DPI systems, which is relevant for
corporate systems; and 3. Use of steganography
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may help bypass security checks by anti-APT
products (as the latter cannot process all image
files as corporate networks contain too many of
them, and common analysis algorithms are
expensive computationally) (Priyanka, Sahoo
2016; Chen, Huygens, Desmet, Joosen 2016;
Daryabar, Dehghantanha, Broujerdi 2011) .
It is confirmed that Steganography is also
used by the malware Vawtrak, Zbot , Lurk, and
Stegoloader. In early 2015, Vawtrak started
using steganography to hide its settings in
favicons. The malware downloads a favicon.ico
file from a server hosted on TOR using the
tor2web service. This favicon.ico image is the
one displayed by browsers at the left side of a
URL. Generally, each website contains a
favicon.ico image, so security products seeing
such requests would typically not test them for
validity. Next, the malware extracts a least
significant bit from each pixel and constructs a
URL for downloading its configuration file
(Wyke 2015; Pevny, Kopp, Kfoustek, Ker 2016).

One variant of the Zbot malware also uses
steganography to hide its configuration data.
This variant downloads a JPEG on the victim's
system. The configuration data hides inside this
image. Later, the malware extracts the
configuration data from the image and performs
further malicious actions.
The Lurk malware uses steganography to
download other malware onto targeted systems.
Instead of simply downloading and executing a
malicious binary, Lurk first downloads a BMP
image. It uses a least-significant-bit (LSB)
algorithm to embed encrypted URLs into the
image file. It then extracts the embedded URLs
from the image file and then downloads
additional malware.
The Stegoloader malware installs malware
on victims' systems to steal sensitive
information.
On
successful
execution,
Stegoloader downloads a PNG image from a
legitimate website. It uses steganography to
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embed its main module's code inside the
downloaded PNG . The malware retrieves the
hidden data by applying a steganographic
extraction algorithm (Bureau, Deitrich 2015).
The recently discovered Stegano (also
known as Astrum) exploit kit, has been used in
the past months as part of a very ingenious
malvertising campaign. Stegano authors have
operated by embedding malicious code inside
the RGBA transparency value of each pixel of
PNG banner ads. As users viewed the ads,
JavaScript code would parse the PNG image,
extract the malicious code and redirect the user
to the exploit kit landing page, where he would
be infected with various types of malware.
Besides Stegano, the second exploit kit
discovered in 2016 that heavily relies on
steganography is named DNSChanger. The
group behind DNSChanger created malicious
ads that contained code that launched bruteforce attacks against the user's home WiFi
router. Attackers were taking control over the
victim's router, and injecting ads in all his web
traffic. Once again, steganography was crucial
to hide this malicious code inside the ads'
images, which helped the cybercriminal authors
hide the exploit kit's activity from security
researchers.
One of the major players operating in the
exploit kit market has also turned its efforts to
using steganography. The exploit kit's name is
'Sundown,' an exploit kit developed a group of
German-speaking
developers
who
called
themselves the "Yugoslav Business Network" (or
YBN).
Until recently, Sundown operators never
bothered to mask exploit code delivered to user
files . Security researchers looking at traffic logs
could easily identify the Sundown exploit
package by looking at URLs, which often
contained files ending in ".SWF" or ".XAP"
extensions, specific to Flash and Silverlight
exploits.
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After a recent update, Sundown now hides
these exploits as mundane ".PNG" files. The
file's header says the file is a PNG image, but
its content contains the actual exploit. Sundown
traffic is now much harder to detect, and
researchers have to put more work in unmasking
Sundown operations, just as its operators
wanted.
This addition of steganography in Sundown
operations was spotted recently and appears to
have been inspired by previous three
malvertising campaigns. The first is the massive
AdGholas malvertising campaign, which ran on
the Angler and Neutrino exploit kits, the second
is the GooNky malvertising campaign, and the
third is a malvertising campaign that delivered
the CryLocker ransomware via the RIG exploit
kit.
In all cases, the cybercriminals behind these
malvertising campaigns had used steganography
to deliver PNG images to victims, which
contained malicious code that scanned their
computer, and later delivered downloaded
malware.
The most successful of the malware ad
campaigns was the AdGholas campaign, which
raged on undetected for almost a year (Cabaj,
Caviglione, Mazurczyk, Wendel, Woodward,
Zander 2018). The success of those campaigns
has apparently convinced the Sundown
organization to run many steganography
experiments of their own.
By disguising malicious content as PNG
files, Sundown is now following the new trend
that has slowly taken hold of the exploit kit
market in the past year. It is estimated that it
will continue to use steganography, at least until
security firms find a way to quickly identify
malicious PNG files and block them.
Data exfiltration, also known as 'data theft,'
is the unauthorized transfer of sensitive
information from a computer or a server. In
2016, there were attacks related to Magento, an
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online e-commerce platform. The attacks used
image steganography to hide payment card
details. After execution, the malicious code
collected the payment card details and hid this
inside a local image file, such as an actual
product picture. Once data collection was
completed, the attacker then downloaded the
image file (typical for an e-commerce website)
and extracted the hidden data (Melanson 2017).
These trends described above in particular
suggest that malware writers are on the verge of
adopting steganography on a mass scale. Most
modern anti-malware solutions provide little, if
any, protection from steganography. As a result,
any steganographic carrier file such as a digital
image or even a video file, that can be used to
conceal stolen data, or communications between
a malware program and a command and control
server, will remain undetected.

hnproved Det.ection
Procedures and Techniques
2. 2

Many statistical techniques have been
developed over the years to attribute a
probability of a file being a steganographic cover
file, but owing to the various methodologies and
data payload densities, these methods can be
considered unreliable at best. In certain cases,
regarding digital image steganography, it may
be possible to visually or algorithmically
determine the original image. This would be the
image file before payload injection takes place.
Normally, image steganography will involve
altering the least significant bits (LSBs) in the
cover image. By comparing the original image
LSBs to the payload image LSBs, a positive
identification cannot take place indicating the
use
of
steganography.
In
performing
steganalysis, possessing the payload image file
alone leaves little option than the use of
statistically based probabilistic tools for
attribution (Walia, Jain, Navdeep 2010).
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However, by locating the original digital
image file for comparison, the alteration of LSBs
alone is quite the forensic "smoking gun," so to
speak, for reliable attribution for the use of
steganography software to send messages or
data files. This could be a starting point for
further investigation for law enforcement or
other investigative authorities.
In
performing
good
steganographic
procedure, a suspect will take care to data wipe
any original cover file, to prevent such a
comparison from taking place. However, in
practice, human error and technical limitations
may prevent completely effective data erasure
of the original cover image. In that light, we
recommend an active search for the original
image if suspicion of steganographic usage
exists. There are many possibilities for locating
the original image that will allow later positive
attribution for the use of steganography. The
following lists many examples of the large
number of potential locations to find an original
image for comparison.
Places to find non-payload (also known as a
"cover") image:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Suspect hard drive filesystems
Suspect removable USB drives
Suspect cameras and mobile devices
Suspect CDs and DVDs
Local email inboxes/ outboxes
Cloud email inboxes/ outboxes
Recent web search and browser histories
Google image searches
Network attached storage devices
Employment computers and networks
Recycle bins
Deleted files removed from recycle bins
Online photo galleries
Personal and business associates' files as
listed above

Any image presenting the same visual
appearance and pixel dimensions is an excellent
candidate to be the original cover image file. In
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that light we offer novel digital forensics
software to allow the investigator to perform a
quick and more convenient LSB analysis in
comparison to make a positive identification.
Further, the LSB comparison image results can
be conveniently copied and pasted for reports
documents for conclusive proof of the use of
steganography.

3.

THE

"CO UNTERSTEG"
SOFTWARE
The software introduced with this paper,
CounterSteg, is available free of charge from the
following
website:
http: // 199.l 75.52.196/ CounterSteg/ .
This
Windows- based software allows the loading of
two images and comparison of pixel color bits in
the LSB plane. The software will also run under
Linux with Wine installed. Detailed analysis is
performed visually at the moment; however, we
envision future algorithms which can automate
the results conclusion positively. The software
can be used to detect differences between
original and payload image. Positive detection
implies, in general, identical pixel dimensions
and most pixels identical except for various LSB
values. Human forensic analysis does confirm
final analysis using additional informed
investigation techniques described in this paper.

3.1

Reconnnended Usage

If a suspect image is detected, a search should

be conducted for visually similar and pixel
dimensionally identical images in the locations
listed above , among others. Once potential
matches are identified, the software should be
used to look for differences in the LSB and
perhaps nearby planes. If such differences are
detected, it can be considered positive
identification for the use of steganography,
although it is unlikely the original message or
data can be recovered, except with the
cooperation of the suspect, or acquisition of the
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original software and/ or encryption key used to
embed the data; however, with positive results
in hand, this further investigation or warrant
acquisition can be embarked upon with great
confidence.

3. 2
Results Using Various
Steg;anographic Programs for

Experimentation and Analysis
The following are the results of steganography
analysis and detection with commonly available
tools that may be used by a cybercriminal, or
other suspect, free of charge. These programs
include:

•

•

•

•

•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

OpenPuff
http: //embeddedsw.net / OpenPuff_Ste
ganography _ Home.html
Steganography
Online
http: / / stylesuxx.github.io/ steganograp
hy/
Geocaching
Toolbox
https: //www.geocachingtoolbox.com/ in
dex. php ?page= steganography
OTP-Steg
http: //www.mauisolarsoftware.com/ OT
P-Steg/
f5stego.js
http: //desudesutalk.github.io/ f5stegojs

I
DevFarmSteganography
https: / / devfarm.it / steganography /
StegoShare
http: / / stegoshare.sourceforge.net/
BitCrypt
http: / / bitcrypt.mosheszweizer. com/
OpenStego
https: / / www.openstego.com/ index.html
Other programs unable to be tested at
this time were:
Steghide
http: //steghide.sourceforge.net / downlo
ad.php
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•

•

•

•

•

SteganPEG
http: //download.cnet.com/ SteganPEG
/ 3000-2193 _ 4-75914262.html
ManyTools
Steganography
https: / / manytools.org/ hackertools / steganography-encode-text-intoimage /
Steganographic Encoder (Steghide) https: / / futureboy.us/ stegano/ encinput.
html
Mobilefish
https: / / www.mobilefish.com/ services/ st
eganography / steganography. php
Kwebbel
http: //www.kwebbel.net/ stega/ enindex
.php

The authors will attempt tests
untested and additional tools soon.

with

As examples of the type of forensic
steganalysis that can be conducted with
CounterSteg, we have embedded text data into
a standard cover image using some of the above
listed and easily available steganographic
programs. Each of these programs was accessed
directly from a website or downloaded
executable. Each took less than 10-20 minutes
to use to embed the standard text data into the
standard cover image, which is shown on the
next page in Figure 1.
The standard cover image shown below was
taken by one of the authors in Keyser, West
Virginia in the Fall of 2015, using a Nikon D90
digital camera. This image shows a fairly even
distribution of red, green, and blue colors
throughout the image, except for the center top
open to the sky. In this specific area, the camera
CMOS
sensor
saturated
to
white
(RGB[255,255,255]), and each of the pixels here
represents that single saturated white color.
This is notable for LSB steganography in that
steganographic programs that modify pixels in
this area will be more easily statistically
detected. Alterations to the LSB values in pixels
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in solid color, or saturated, portions of the image
are a good indicator of nonstandard
modifications (such as steganography) . Good

CDFSL Proceedings 2018
steganographic programs will attempt to avoid
modifications to these specific areas, among
others.

Figure 1. Cover image taken with Nikon D90 camera.

The standard text embedded in the image
was the President Kennedy inauguration
speech, which is 1,366 words, and 7,512
characters. The size of the text is 7.38 KB (7,566
bytes) , file size on disk was 8.00 KB (8,192
bytes). Kennedy's inauguration speech was
delivered on January 20, 1961.
The CounterSteg program produces detailed
visual analysis and comparison of digital images,
specifically in each color and bit-plane, in
addition to combinations of colors in a
particular bit-plane. The figure below shows
that the image analysis window, which
calculates results for 45 various bit plane and
color combinations. The Alpha channel is the
transparency channel and remains on unused in
many images.
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Surprisingly, however, some steganographic
programs make spurious or data-carrying
modifications in the alpha channel, so it is
important to also keep an investigative eye on
this color channel. In the analysis window
shown below, each color channel is broken down
by bits, with bit 0 corresponding to the LSB,
and bit 7 corresponding to the MSB. The values
in each bit plane are shown for red, green, and
blue channels, as well as the alpha channel. For
the graphic shown for II All Bits, 11 the pixel color
here will be non- black if any of the bi ts (0-7) is
set to a nonzero. The color value is the relative
intensity of that color (red, green, or blue) in
the range of 0 to 255.
Finally, the image shown in the grid in the
upper-left for "All Bits" and "All Colors" is
basically the original image, since it shows the
combined color values in all channels and all
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bits. Any of the images shown in the grid can
be clicked on to bring up a new window showing
that image full-size. This can be copied and
pasted into an image editing program for further
analysis or the saving of the image.
The overall idea and philosophy of the
CounterSteg steganalysis software is to allow
the convenient analysis and comparison of
before and after images to look for the telltale
traces of steganographic software activity and
modifications. In many cases, these follow
similar patterns, and the forensic analysis
conducted can make informed conclusions based
on typical similar patterns from the various
categories of steganographic software currently
available . The software available generally falls
into several categories, which for the purposes
of this paper we will categorize as: 3. the good,
2. the bad, and 1. the ugly.

quality of software can be easily detected even
without the original cover image for comparison.
Even in the case of good steganographic
software, having the original cover image on
hand makes positive identification of the
activity highly probable.
The cover image analysis window shown
below clearly depicts the area of white
saturation in the upper center of the image (the
area open to the sky through the trees). Other
color and blue channels show a reasonable
distribution of intensities throughout most areas
of the image. Ideally, for steganographic
activities, areas of solid colors, saturation, and
low noise between colors and shades should be
avoided. This is to circumvent statistical
analysis of the steganographic payload carrying
image that may indicate a high probability of
data carrying modifications.

We will start showing telltale traces from
"ugly" steganographic software, typically this
. Image Analysl•

C I_ Coun1orS1ogllmagoTooi.lDSC2oe8_Conrlmago png '

All Bits

7

6

5

4

2

1

e

All
Col.Of" •

Figure 2. Analysis of cover image.

Clicking on the LSB (bit 0) image for all
colors, the image below is brought up and is
shown as Figure 3. This image shows the bits
colored for whether red, green, or blue pixel
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LSBs are sent to O or 1. Various color shades are
shown depending on multiple values, however if
only one bit is set, such as red, the pixel will
remain red as shown in the red bit O color image
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shown as part of Figure 1. Using the LSB image
can give an idea of the relative distribution of
LSB values in the image in various colors. In
general, for many photographs, the distribution
will be largely random except for saturated or

CDFSL Proceedings 2018
solid color areas of the image. This image is
starting point for our further analysis,
modifications to the LSB bit plane
particularly evident in certain qualities
steganographic software available.

the
as
are
of

Figure 3. LSB values analysis of cover image.

Also contained within the CounterSteg is the
ability to visually show pixel variations between
colors in a local area. Below, in Figure 4 is an
image that shows the variation in the green
color channel. Areas of lighter colors indicate
higher variation (which could be considered
noise) between pixel colors in nearby areas of
the image. Since the area of the sky is black this indicates no variation and LSB, or other bit

@ 2018 ADFSL

planes - modifications will be more easily
statistically detectable here.
The figure below depicts the green color
channel variation using all bits. Variation is
based on the calculation of peak signal to noise
ratio (PSNR) of each pixel green color versus its
neighbors.
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.
'#;

Figure

4.

·:

Pixel green color varia tion throughout the cover image.

In addition to CounterSteg providing bit by
bit and color analysis for a single image, the
software also allows image comparisons using a
similar breakdown. The comparison of the
original cover image to a contrast adjusted
image is shown below. In this breakdown, only
differences between pixels, colors, and bits are
shown. Below each comparison image is shown
the total number of bit , color, and/ or pixel
differences (depending on the analysis), as well
as the percentage of changes relative to the total
number of changes possible.
This analysis window allows quick and
convenient comparison between an assumed
original cover image, and the assumed
steganographic payload image. The specific
type, location, and scale of the differences can
help to clearly identify steganographic activities
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that have been performed on the image, the
likely image payload size, and perhaps even the
likely specific steganographic software that has
been used in certain cases. In the following
narrative, we will detail forensic profiles of
various software packages and their results.

3. 3

Cbntrast Adjustment

As an example of a standard image adjustment
in comparison, below is the results of comparing
the original cover image to a modified image
with a small contrast adjustment. In addition to
large modifications in the LSB plane we are also
seeing large to small modifications in all other
bit planes, and in all colors. In general, if two
visually similar versions of an image exist seeing changes like this in comparison would
generally not indicate steganographic activities .
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.... C :\_ CounterSteg\lmageTests\DSC2068_Coverlmage png [vs] C:\_ CounterSteg\lmage
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Figure 5. Comparison of cover image to contrast adjusted image.

3.4

Brightness Adjustment

Similar to the small contrast adjustment, a
brightness adjustment of the original image

results in a comparison profile showing large
modifications in all colors and in all bit planes.

. C I CountorStoollmageTo•~IOSC2068_Covcrlmage.png l••J C:LCouni.rS119~eTHUIO

All Bits

7

6

s

4

3

B
1

e

All
Color•

....
GrMn

llwe

Alpl,a

Figure 6. Comparison of cover image to brightness adjusted image.
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3 .5

Gamma Adjustment

The Gamma adjustment color filter compresses
or stretches various colors and would result in a
comparison profile similar to the one shown
below. All colors and all bit planes are greatly
modified. The differences between the two
images will be visually apparent.

editing software, for contrast , brightness, and
gamma adjustment, do not generally yield
comparison results similar to what we will
depict in the following narrative for
steganographic related changes. This is with one
exception, BitCrypt, which should still be
detectable using other digital forensic clues and
analysis.

In conclusion, standard image filters , such
as those found in Photoshop, or other image
, C I _ CountorStog\lmag•T••t•IDSC20GS_Covcrlmag• png 1••1 C:L CCMlr>torSt.9ilma91T1IUIDSC2008 GammaA~

All Sits

7

6

4

1

e

All
Co lor •

....

llwe

.Upll•

Figure 7. Comparison of cover image to gamma adjusted image.

For the purposes of this paper and analysis,
we will divide steganographic software into
three general categories ranging from the ugly
to the good and including the bad in between.
Each software embeds a digital payload with
varying levels of detectable qualities. The ugly
is the worst, and should result in the easiest
forensic detections, even without possessing the
original cover image. In the case of good
software, embedded data will be virtually
undetectable without the original cover image
for comparison.
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However, in the case of good software, with
the cover image original on hand, a forensic bit
plane comparison makes the activity even then
easily evident. This is in comparison to typical
image changes shown from standard image
filters, such as contrast, brightness, and gamma
adjustment , explained previously. Possession of
the original cover image makes positive
identification and attribution possible in almost
all circumstances.
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THE UGLY

Typically, ugly software takes a "let it rip"
attitude and just shoves the data to be
embedded into the LSB image color plane,
without regard to how easily this would be
possibly detected using a forensic analysis.

4 .1

St.eg;anography Online

http: / / stylesuxx.github.io/ steganography /

This particular software apparently first
completely zeroes out the LSB bit plane in all
colors, and then encodes the data into a narrow
strip at the top of the image. This is visually
evident in the analysis image shown below where all LSB bits are simply set to zero, except
for the data at the top. This is the least
sophisticated and most na:ive of all the
steganographic software we will be analyzing the ugly .
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Fiqure 8 Analysis of image created bv Steganographv Online

In the comparison image shown below, you
can see all bit planes are identical from bit plane
7 to 1. All modifications take place in bit plane
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0 (LSB), which is in fact first set to zero, and
then the data is encoded.
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Figure 9. Comparison of cover image to image created by Steganography Online.

The image shown below is an expansion of
all colors in bit plane 0, the data containing
strip at the top is easily evident. In particular,
the area of saturated white pixels at the top is

completely overwritten. This software will be
easily forensically detectable and identifiable in
usage.

Figure 10. LSB values of Steganography Online image

Page 174

@ 2018 ADFSL

Positive Identification of LSB Image ...

S tego.Share

4. 2

http: / / stegoshare.sourceforge.net /
The next ugliest software uses a similar
approach; however, does not completely zero
out the LSB plane. In addition, it makes
modifications to bit plane 1 and 2, for reasons
, lm•go AnaJy.,,

CDFSL Proceedings 2018
unknown. Other bit planes remain unchanged.
Further, some type of narrow strip of
information is embedded in the top center of the
image. Analyzing the image in bit planes 0, 1,
and 2, as shown below, clearly depicts the
modifications.
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Figure 11. StegoShare image analysis.

In comparing the images, you can see the
large percentage (33-50%) of modifications
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made to bit plane 0, 1, and 2, with the exception
of green in bit plane 2.
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Figure 12. Ste)l;oShare ima)l;e comparison.

The expansion of the changes to all colors in
all bit planes image shown below shows the
narrow strip of information also embedded into

the top center of the image. This is shown m
Figure 13 that follows.

Fiaure 13. StegoShare LSB values.

Page 176

@ 2018 ADFSL

Positive Identification of LSB Image ...

CDFSL Proceedings 2018

Geocaching Toolbox

4. 3

https: //www.geocachingtoolbox.com/ index.php
?page= steganography
This software only alters the LSB bit plane
in all three colors; however, it includes all the
data into a narrow strip at the bottom of the
image. This would be easily detectable using RS

statistical analysis as changes to the bit patterns
in only a small fraction of the image (the portion
containing the data). The overall analysis of the
image, as shown below in Figure 14, does not
indicate much forensically. In this case, we also
need the original cover image for comparison,
which then makes the positive conclusion
evident.
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Fiqure 14. Geocaching Toolbox image analysis.

Below in Figure 15 is the comparison image,
showing the data payload embedded to the
narrow strip in the bottom of the image.
However, due to the small amount of pixel
changes (1 %) , it is likely at least the software
compresses the data before embedding.
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Compressing the text data before embedding
typically can reduce the size of the necessary
modifications to the image by 80 to 90%. As a
result, higher quality steganographic software
will always compress data before engaging in the
image embedding process.

Page 177

CDFSL Proceedings 2018

Positive Identification of LSB Image ...

" C I_ CountorSlc11llmagcTo,to\DSC2Qti8_C"v•rlmagc pr,g Iv.] C.LC"1olr>tc1Slll1l~m,190TH1>ilDSCZ068 GoooaohingToolbox.~g

All Bits

7

6

4

l

All
Co,l or •

Reel

Alpha

Fiaure 15. Geocachine: Toolbox image comoarison.

The narrow strip is clearly visible in Figure
16 at the bottom.

Figure 16. Geocaching Toolbox LSB changes.
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DevFarmSteg;an.ogra.phy

4 .4

https:/ / devfarm.it / steganography /
This software is comparable to the previous
software, Geocaching Toolbox, and may make

use of the same st eganographic embedding
libraries. The modifications to the image are
very similar , with only slight differences in the
number of pixels modified.

~~
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Figure 17. DevFarm Steganography image analysis.
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Figure 18. DevFarm Steganography image comparison .
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Fiaure 1.9. DevFarm Stee:anoe:raohv LSB imae:e chane:es.

5.

THEBAD

The best software is an improvement over the
ugly, at least narrow strips of pixels are not
apparently encoded (and more easily detected) ,
however security shortcomings are still evident.

5.1

f5stegoJs

http: //desudesutalk.github.io/ f5stegojs /
This software seems to take the unique
approach of ignoring the LSB and simply
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encoding data depending whether color values
are odd or even. Even though many of the pixel
colors are modified through multiple bit planes,
some of the color values remain unchanged. This
is evident in the comparison image of all bits in
all colors shown as Figure 21.
An analysis of the image shown in Figure 20
does not show undue pixel modifications or
strips; however, due to the large amount of color
changes, visual differences will be evident
between the original and modified image.
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Figure 20. f5stegojs image analysis.

Below, in Figure 21, is the comparison
analysis . Notice that all bit planes and all colors
are modified. On first analysis, this would
appear to be very similar to the contrast
adjustment shown previously, however in that
case virtually all pixels are modified, except for
the saturated white area. In this case, many
pixels remain unchanged, hinting at the
possibility of "all bit 11 encoding. In other words,
data is encoded by overall color intensity value
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for the respective color channel, red, blue, or
green (in the range O to 255). Depending on
whether the color intensity is odd or even, this
indicates the value of the bit for that particular
color channel. Three bits can be encoded for
each pixel in this fashion; however, forensic
analysis of the steganographic image easily
identifies a payload because of the fact that only
selective pixels are modified.
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Figure 21. f5stego_is image changes.

As shown below in Figure 22 in the
expansion of the comparison image in all color
LSB bits - many pixels remain unchanged in
an apparent random fashion. It is likely
saturated pixels are avoided (an aspect of

quality in this software), and random noise is
added in areas of the image not needed for
further data encoding. Overall, 69% of the pixel
color values in this image have been modified.

Figure 22. f5stegojs LSB image changes.
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5. 2

BitCcypt

http: / / bitcrypt.moshe-szweizer.com/
BitCrypt fails in the area of modifying
saturated white pixels and makes this software
more easily detectable. The sophisticated
forensic analyst will be aware that camera
CMOS sensors typically saturate to maximum
values in bright areas, such as the sky, will not
vary between colors pixel to pixel. These block

CDFSL Proceedings 2018
areas will be fully saturated and will remain so
through the area of the similar object, such as
the overcast sky. Modifications to pixels in these
areas will be telltale signs for software image
message or data carrying modifications.
An overall analysis of the image shows the
bit O and 1 modifications in the area of
saturation. Bits 2-7 appear to be largely
unchanged in the area of saturation.
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Fiqure 23. BitCrypt image analysis.

Comparison with the cover image shows the
broad modification of pixel colors in bits 0
through 7; however, the area of saturation is
avoided above bit 1. This most likely is a
software coding implementation to create a
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similarity with a standard image processing
function, such as brightness, contrast, or gamma
adjustment; however, in those cases, the
changes in the saturated area will propagate up
through bit 7, and including bit 7.
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Figure 24. BitCrypt image comparison.

Further, the expansion of the bit O in all
colors graphic analysis depicts the seemingly
random dispersal of LSB bit changes, except for
the relative lack of changes in the saturated
area. This particular forensic pattern for
steganographic activity is indeed unique. While
subtly different from standard image processing

comparison results, the bit modification pattern
should still be able to be classified and
identifiable. Further test images should be
created, and comparisons conducted in the
future to analyze and identify with further
clarity the modifications BitCrypt makes to
images.

Figure 25. BitCrypt LSB image changes .
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5. 3

OpenPuff

http: //embeddedsw.net/ OpenPuff_Steganogra
phy _ Home.html
While completely avoiding the saturated
pixel area, which is good, OpenPuff attempts to
modify far too many pixels to not be detectable
especially with a comparison image in hand. The
software only modifies pixels in the LSB plane,
making it virtually undetectable visually.
However, overall 12% of the pixels are modified

CDFSL Proceedings 2018
in the image - compare this to 1% even with
less sophisticated programs. Statistical analysis
of the image will reveal changes to typical
photograph LSB bit patterns in typical similar
photos with similar CMOS sensors.
Overall analysis of the image, as shown
below in Figure 26, does not reveal any
particular fine points for analysis - making
OpenPuff the best of the bad software for
Steganography in this paper analysis.
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Figure 26. OpenPuff image analysis.

As shown below in Figure 27, OpenPuff only
makes changes to the LSB values in the image
but does these to far too great an extent at 12%.
This leaves the payload image vulnerable to
statistical analysis techniques.
With a
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comparison image m hand, since only LSB
values are modified, it is highly probable to
conclude steganographic payload has been
embedded into the image.
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Figure 27. OpenPuff image comparison.

Further, as shown below in Figure 28, the
software takes care to avoid saturated color
pixel areas . This is commendable; however,
without exception, all other areas of the image

are highly modified, possibly with random data.
This apparently random data will be more
apparent to sophisticated image forensic
analysis techniques.

Figure 28. OpenPuff LSB image changes.
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THE GOOD

6.

The good steganographic software available in
general attempts to do several things. It creates
a low payload profile, in our examples below 1%
of the pixel values only of the image are
modified. This compares to the 12% to 83% of
the pixels modified by the other software
analyzed previously. Less modifications will
correspond to and equal less detectability. Also,
it is important to disperse the changes into
various areas of the image, specifically areas of
higher noise and color variation. Areas of solid
colors or pixel saturation should be actively and
strongly avoided to lower the possibility and
probability of forensic detectability.

OpenStego

6.1

https: //www.openstego.com/ index.html
OpenStego takes care to compress the data
before embedding, reducing the overall payload
size to about 1% of the image pixels. Also, it
disperses the data encoding seemingly randomly
throughout the image.
The overall image analysis shown below in
Figure 29 provides little for further examination
if only the payload image exists. It is likely any
known statistical analysis technique will fall flat
and fail when trying to determine if any data
modifications have been performed on the
existing image in hand.
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Figure 29. OpenStego image analysis.

The comparison analysis window shown
below in Figure 30 indicates only LSB values
have been modified, in all three-color channels.
The color channels share equally with
modifications, at about 1% each. OpenStego,
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therefore, is not taking into account relative
individual color variations when deciding where
to embed data values in various color channels.
No modifications are made to the alpha
(transparency) color channel.
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Figure 30. OpenStego image comparison.

Below in Figure 31 are shown the LSB
modifications in each color channel. Apparently,
this is a random distribution not taking into
account color variations throughout the image

as previously mentioned. Also, the software does
not apparently take into consideration noise
levels or saturation levels as well when encoding
data.

Figure 31 . OpenStego LSB image changes.
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6.2

6.2 OTP-Steg

http: //www.mauisolarsoftware.com/ OTPSteg/
OTP-Steg receives its name from one-time
pad encryption, which is used for encrypting the
data in this software before compression and
encoding of the data. OTP-Steg uses the zlib
library to compress all data heavily before
encoding. Further, the encoding process looks
for and avoids saturated color or solid color

CDFSL Proceedings 2018
areas of the image. It conducts a noise and
variation color analysis of the entire image, to
prioritize encoding of LSB data into less
statistically detectable areas.
Overall payload image analysis, shown
below in Figure 32, shows no features different
from a standard photograph in all bit planes.
Also, the payload image will be visually
indistinguishable from the cover image, as only
LSB values are modified.
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Figure 32. OTP-Steg image analysis.

The comparison to the cover image window
shown below in Figure 33 indicates only 1% of
the LSB values have been modified. Notice this
also in fact varies significantly between color
channel, with the red color channel carrying
more than double the respective payloads of the
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green and blue channels. This is because red
color variation varies much more significantly
through the image than the green and blue color
variations. Thus, data carried in the red channel
will be much harder to detect statistically.
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Figure 33. OTP-Steg image comparison.

Shown below in Figure 34 is the image of
the specific LSB values changed, in the three
visible colors. Changes are dispersed randomly
throughout the image, with respect to noise
variation. The saturated sky area is completely
avoided. Noticeably, red is much more heavily

encoded into the blue and green. This image has
a much stronger red component than the other
two colors. However, where blue or green are
dominant, that is the color encoded into them
that respective area. Only one-color channel bit
per pixel is allowed to be modified.

Figure 34, OTP-Steg LSB image changes.
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7.

CDFSL Proceedings 2018

SIIMILAR IlVlAGE
SEARCH

To aid in locating images for further
investigation, the CounterSteg software includes
facilities for similar image searching on all

machine drives and directories. The similar
image search will identify images of identical
pixel dimensions and most significant bit values.
The value for search of most significant bit
similarity percentage is software selectable. The
search window design is shown below as Figure
35.
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Fiqure 35. Similar image search (similar in MSB values) .

8.

FUTURE WORK

We hope to automate the positive identification
using image LSB comparison in the future by
developing algorithms to conduct analyses.
Most likely this will be based on a statistical
measure of similarity between pixel color bits
above the LSB plane, and difference measures
in the LSB plane. In other words, primarily the
LSB bits are altered between the image files,
preserving the visual appearance, but only
altering the data carrying LSB values.
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Having such an automated algorithm in
hand will greatly assist with the current
phenomenon of malware making use of
steganography to exfiltrate user and corporate
data, such as credit cards, through detection
systems designed to thwart such illicit
transmissions. The detection system we envision
would be based upon "caching" previously
known images and comparing transmitted
images to ones found in the cache database.
Further, web image searches could be conducted
by the system to check against images currently
in transit. Detection of payload carrying images
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could create a red flag to alert security staff to
the fact that data exfiltration may be taking
place, or that a malware infestation is receiving
command and control messages through
payload carrying images.
Also, it may be possible to automate part of
the process for similar image searching and
retrieval using the Google custom search API
facilities.

9.

CONCLUSION

Positively detecting the use of steganography in
digital image files generally results in an
unreliable and inconclusive effort. At least by
attempting to actively recover the original
image , before pixel bit alteration, is estimated
to make this procedure much more reliable for
positive identification by providing investigative
software to allow such a comparison efficiently.
Instead of performing statistical analysis to
overall
produce
dubious
results,
if
steganography is suspected, we posit the
investigator would be more effective in simply
looking for the original image file for
comparison. With comparison software in place,
the investigator can assign virtually conclusive
attribution. This can be immediately obtained
as shown in the numerous examples previously
presented in this paper, and useful as evidence
in legal proceedings or requests for initial or
additional warrants.
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